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Microsoft Intune

Zero Trust Execution Defense with Windows 10 Security Baselines, AppLocker, and WDAC

A 2020 endpoint hardening blueprint combining Intune MDM Security Baselines with Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and AppLocker binary allowlisting to block untrusted ransomware and LOLBin payloads.

·10 min read·
#WDAC#AppLocker#Security Baselines#Windows 10#Intune#Application Control
Zero Trust Execution Defense with Windows 10 Security Baselines, AppLocker, and WDAC

Executive Summary and Endpoint Hardening Context

Removing local administrator rights stops system-wide driver tampering, yet standard users can still launch unsigned ransomware executables or abuse Living-off-the-Land binaries (LOLBins) directly inside %AppData% or Downloads. Reactive antivirus signatures cannot stop newly compiled malware reliably. Uniting Intune Windows 10 Security Baselines with Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and AppLocker replaces default-allow execution with cryptographic allowlisting.

From an architectural evolution standpoint, this foundational design connects directly to modern platform controls. The WDAC Audit-to-Enforce and Managed Installer discipline pioneered in 2020 underpins modern Windows 11 App Control for Business, Smart App Control, and Intune Endpoint Compliance Governance.

Hardware and Kernel Trust Boundaries and Design Principles

  • Intune Security Baselines apply 200+ Microsoft-recommended Defender, BitLocker, Firewall, and LSA hardening settings through version-managed MDM templates.
  • WDAC partners with VBS Credential Guard and HVCI to verify kernel and user-mode code integrity (UMCI/KMCI) by publisher certificate or hash.
  • AppLocker pairs cleanly for user/group exceptions and enforces PowerShell Constrained Language Mode for non-admin sessions.
  • BitLocker, Credential Guard, HVCI/VBS, App Control (WDAC), Cloud PKI, and Windows LAPS must align with TPM 2.0/UEFI Secure Boot readiness and resolve legacy GPO/custom OMA-URI precedence conflicts across pilot rings.

Prerequisites, MDM Conflict Resolution, and RBAC Boundaries

  • Licensing: Intune MDM Security Baselines come with Microsoft 365 E3/E5; WDAC runs across Windows 10 Pro/Enterprise and CSP AppLocker targets Windows 10 Enterprise/Education (M365 E3/E5).
  • Platform & RBAC: Windows 10 1903+ supporting multi-policy .cip binary deployments governed under least-privilege Endpoint Security Manager permissions.
  • Telemetry Prerequisite: Forward CodeIntegrity Operational events (IDs 3076/3077) and AppLocker logs to Log Analytics or Defender for Endpoint.

Technical Verification, Compliance, and Policy Controls

PowerShell Endpoint Posture and Configuration Check

PowerShell ConfigCI script generating an Audit-mode WDAC binary policy and inspecting local CodeIntegrity Event ID 3076:

  • Execution Environment and Prerequisites: Requires Local administrator / Windows endpoint host.
  • Least Privilege and Operation Separation: Run with least-privilege inspection or scoped administrative permissions. This block pairs **read-only (Get-*/Search-*) posture queries with state-changing (New-*/Set-*/Enable-*)** examples; execute mutating steps strictly under change control in a pilot ring (using -WhatIf where supported) before broad rollout.
  • Security Control Mapped and Boundary Note: Verifies active policy state and guards against silent drift or mis-scoped rollouts without blind production changes.
powershell
# 1. Build an Audit-mode WDAC policy scanning Program Files using Microsoft ConfigCI cmdlets
$BaseXml = "C:\SecOpsPolicies\CanerCetinkaya_WDAC_Audit.xml"
New-CIPolicy -Level Publisher -Fallback Hash -FilePath $BaseXml -UserPEs -ScanPath "C:\Program Files"
Set-RuleOption -FilePath $BaseXml -Option 3   # Option 3 = Enabled:Audit Mode
Set-RuleOption -FilePath $BaseXml -Option 0   # Option 0 = Enabled:UMCI
ConvertFrom-CIPolicy -XmlFilePath $BaseXml -BinaryFilePath "C:\SecOpsPolicies\CanerCetinkaya_WDAC_Audit.cip"

# 2. Query local CodeIntegrity Audit events (Event ID 3076) from last 7 days
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational"; Id=3076; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Select-Object -First 20 TimeCreated, Message

Device Health Telemetry and KQL Verification Query

KQL threat hunt summarizing WDAC Audit and Block binary events across the endpoint fleet:

kql
// Execution Scope: Read-only hunting/audit query (Log Analytics Reader / Security Reader)
// Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR Advanced Hunting / Sentinel MDE Connector (DeviceEvents)
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType in ("AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited", "AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyBlocked", "AppControlExecutableAudited")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256, ActionType
| summarize AttemptCount = count(), Devices = dcount(DeviceName) by FileName, FolderPath, ActionType
| order by AttemptCount desc

Critical Architectural Assessment, Rollout Risks, and Rollback Strategy

  • Overlapping Security Baselines and Custom Policies: Configuring identical ASR or BitLocker settings across both profiles causes Intune conflict reporting; enforce a single authoritative policy.
  • Enforcing WDAC Without Managed Installer Authorization: Newly pushed Intune Win32 apps fail to execute unless authorized via Managed Installer or code-signing rules.
  • Risks Mitigated vs. Residual Limitations: BitLocker, Credential Guard, HVCI/VBS, App Control/WDAC, Cloud PKI, and Windows LAPS defeat offline disk extraction, LSASS credential theft, unsigned kernel drivers (BYOVD), and shared-admin Pass-the-Hash pivoting; however, they do not prevent post-login abuse using signed system binaries (LOLBins) when App Control/ASR isn't enforced, nor do they protect legacy hardware lacking TPM 2.0/Secure Boot.
  • New Dependencies and Production Failure Modes: Endpoint reliability depends on TPM 2.0/UEFI readiness, deterministic MDMWinsOverGP precedence, and verified key escrow (BitLocker Entra registration and LAPS Event ID 10025). Enforcing WDAC/AppLocker without audit logs or toggling HVCI onto incompatible drivers triggers boot loops (BSOD) or immediate helpdesk lockouts.
  • Rollback and Pilot Validation Procedure: Roll out every Windows security baseline through IT Canary -> Pilot -> Broad Intune rings, verify escrow recovery keys before retiring legacy tools, and revert breaking policies via Intune group exclusions or Audit mode fallback without stripping core disk encryption.

Verified Primary Sources & Open-Source Repositories

This architectural guide was cross-corroborated against the official advisories, Microsoft Learn docs, and open-source PowerShell / KQL repositories below.

Multi-Channel Distribution Summary (X & LinkedIn Draft)

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Replace default-allow execution with cryptographic allowlisting using Windows 10 Security Baselines, WDAC, and AppLocker. #WDAC #Intune #ZeroTrust

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2020 Windows 10 Application Control guide: resolving Intune baseline conflicts, collecting 30-day Event 3076 WDAC audit telemetry, and Managed Installer configuration.