Windows 11 22H2 Security Leap: Default Credential Guard, LSA Protection, and Smart App Control
Operational guide to managing Windows 11 22H2 default Credential Guard and LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) via Intune Settings Catalog and choosing between Smart App Control and WDAC.
Executive Summary and Endpoint Hardening Context
Historically, hardening LSASS against credential theft tools meant engineering custom GPOs or Intune profiles for Credential Guard and LSA Protection (RunAsPPL). With Windows 11 22H2 Enterprise, Microsoft enabled Credential Guard by default on qualified hardware while introducing AI-backed Smart App Control (SAC) alongside hardened kernel defenses.
From an architectural evolution standpoint, this foundational design connects directly to modern platform controls. Building atop Windows 11 21H2 Secured-Core by turning hardware isolation on by default in 2022, these VBS defenses pair cleanly with Intune Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM).
Hardware and Kernel Trust Boundaries and Design Principles
Credential Guardisolates NTLM hashes and Kerberos TGTs inside Virtual Secure Mode (VSM), thwarting LSASS memory scraping even against compromised kernel drivers.LSA Protection (RunAsPPL)startslsass.exeas a Protected Process Light, blocking unsigned DLL injection and non-Microsoft diagnostic handle access.Smart App Control (SAC)evaluates binary trust via Microsoft Intelligent Security Graph on consumer/SMB clean installs, whereas enterprises govern signed trust centrally with Intune WDAC Baselines.BitLocker,Credential Guard,HVCI/VBS,App Control(WDAC),Cloud PKI, andWindows LAPSmust align withTPM 2.0/UEFI Secure Bootreadiness and resolve legacyGPO/customOMA-URIprecedence conflicts across pilot rings.
Prerequisites, MDM Conflict Resolution, and RBAC Boundaries
- Licensing & Hardware: Windows 11 Enterprise E3/E5 (Microsoft 365 E3/E5), TPM 2.0, UEFI Secure Boot, and virtualization extensions (VT-x/AMD-V + IOMMU).
- RBAC Access: Intune
Endpoint Security ManagerorPolicy and Profile Managerleast-privilege roles. - Deployment Caveat: Smart App Control automatically disables during in-place upgrades and cannot be centrally toggled back on without wiping Windows.
Technical Verification, Compliance, and Policy Controls
PowerShell Endpoint Posture and Configuration Check
Verifying VBS, Credential Guard, LSA Protection, and Smart App Control state via local PowerShell:
- Execution Environment and Prerequisites: Requires Local administrator / Windows endpoint host.
- Least Privilege and Operation Separation: Run with least-privilege inspection or scoped administrative permissions. All statements above are **read-only (
Get-*/Test-*/Search-*)** verification checks making no direct configuration edits; still validate module/network prerequisites in a test cohort first. - Security Control Mapped and Boundary Note: Verifies active policy state and guards against silent drift or mis-scoped rollouts without blind production changes.
# 1. Query Win32_DeviceGuard for active VBS and Credential Guard status
$dg = Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard
[PSCustomObject]@{
VbsStatus = $dg.VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus
SecurityServicesConfigured = ($dg.SecurityServicesConfigured -join ',')
SecurityServicesRunning = ($dg.SecurityServicesRunning -join ',')
}
# 2. Check LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) and LsaCfgFlags in Registry
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name "RunAsPPL", "LsaCfgFlags" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# 3. Inspect Smart App Control state (0=Off, 1=Enforced, 2=Evaluation)
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CI\Policy" -Name "VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinueDevice Health Telemetry and KQL Verification Query
KQL query in Defender for Endpoint hunting LSASS access blocks and Code Integrity policy audit events:
// Execution Scope: Read-only hunting/audit query (Log Analytics Reader / Security Reader)
// Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR Advanced Hunting / Sentinel MDE Connector (DeviceEvents)
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType in ("LsassCredentialDumping", "AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited", "ExploitGuardLsassProtectionAudited")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| summarize AttemptCount = count() by DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by AttemptCount descCritical Architectural Assessment, Rollout Risks, and Rollback Strategy
- Forgetting Legacy NTLMv1 or Unconstrained Delegation Dependencies: Credential Guard enforces modern Kerberos/NTLMv2 flows and breaks legacy NTLMv1 authentication paths.
- Third-Party Password Filters or SSO Agents Failing Under RunAsPPL: Unsigned LSA plugins trigger Event ID 3033/3063 blocks when RunAsPPL turns on; always run an audit phase first.
- Risks Mitigated vs. Residual Limitations:
BitLocker,Credential Guard,HVCI/VBS,App Control/WDAC,Cloud PKI, andWindows LAPSdefeat offline disk extraction,LSASScredential theft, unsigned kernel drivers (BYOVD), and shared-adminPass-the-Hashpivoting; however, they do not prevent post-login abuse using signed system binaries (LOLBins) when App Control/ASR isn't enforced, nor do they protect legacy hardware lackingTPM 2.0/Secure Boot. - New Dependencies and Production Failure Modes: Endpoint reliability depends on
TPM 2.0/UEFI readiness, deterministicMDMWinsOverGPprecedence, and verified key escrow (BitLockerEntra registration andLAPSEvent ID 10025). EnforcingWDAC/AppLockerwithout audit logs or togglingHVCIonto incompatible drivers triggers boot loops (BSOD) or immediate helpdesk lockouts. - Rollback and Pilot Validation Procedure: Roll out every Windows security baseline through
IT Canary -> Pilot -> BroadIntune rings, verify escrow recovery keys before retiring legacy tools, and revert breaking policies via Intune group exclusions orAuditmode fallback without stripping core disk encryption.
Verified Primary Sources & Open-Source Repositories
This architectural guide was cross-corroborated against the official advisories, Microsoft Learn docs, and open-source PowerShell / KQL repositories below.
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Toggle X (Twitter) & LinkedIn sharing draftsHardening Windows 11 22H2 with default Credential Guard, LSA Protection, and Smart App Control vs WDAC. #Windows11 #Intune #EndpointSecurity
Hardware-Backed Credential Defense: Validating Windows 11 22H2 default Credential Guard and RunAsPPL rollouts via Intune without breaking legacy LSA dependencies.